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INTRODUCTION

The various states have given provisional answers to the socially
volatile quest by gay couples for legal recognition of their relationships
as marriage.1 The provisional quality of the policy-making is related to
the status of the language of marriage as a contested site.2 The
language evolves, but pressure exists to stall public acknowledgment of
changes in descriptors for basic relationships. The prominence of

language as itself a matter of dispute gives new and broadened meaning
to classic arguments defending the judicial role on the grounds that
courts function well to advance public discourse, particularly if they do
not impose final answers that are immune to majoritarian revisions.3

The fluidity of the language relating to underlying societal building
blocks puts courts in the business of accelerating change when they
memorialize and record new meanings, when they press for public

1. Some statutes specifically prohibit same-sex marriages. See ALA. CODE § 30-1-19
(2000); ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (2000); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25-101 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-11-109 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-81r (2000);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (2000); O.C.G.A. § 19-3-3.1
(2000); O.C.G.A. § 19-3-30 (2000); IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (2000); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212
(West 2000); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/213.1 (West 2000); IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (2000); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.040 (2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 402.045 (2000); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89 (West 2000); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 96
(West 2000); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3520 (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A,
§ 701 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 551.271 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. § 363.021
(2000); MINN. STAT. § 517.03 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 457:1 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:2 (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2000);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 255 (2000); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1704 (2000); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31,
§ 221 (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (2000); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001 (West 2000);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (2000); W. VA. CODE § 48-1-18a
(2000).
Other statutes generally state that marriage is between a man and woman but do not
specifically mention same-sex marriages. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 2000); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 14-2-104 (2000); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 2-201 (2000); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 451.022 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (2000).
Other statutes allow for same-sex "solemnizations" or unions. See respectively HAW. REV.
STAT. § 572-1.6 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (2000).
2. See ROBIN TOLMACH LAKOFF, THE LANGUAGE WAR 19 (2000) (describing languagebased controversies as being about "[w]ho gets to make meaning for us all" and who can
make "our definitions of ourselves").
3. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962) (emphasizing that
democracy implicates the power of majorities to accomplish reversals of policies not favored
by a current majority); Id. at 27 (arguing that judicial review must be consonant with the
central tenet of democracies and that the majority has the ultimate power to reject any
part of the decision-makers' policy).
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recognition of new linguistic facts, and when they resist new usage in a
manner that is plainly unstable and unconvincing.
Because of the inevitably provisional nature of the responses to
couples' petitions for the right to marry without regard to biological sex,
the states are fated to serve as laboratories for social experiment in the
matter of same-sex marriage and to create occasions for court involvement in discourse about the definition of marriage. Several different
factors render the attempted answers provisional and thus experimental,
no matter who is the decision-maker or speaker.4 First, some forms of
legislative or constitutional statement are so emphatically negative5

4. In calling the answers provisional, I am particularly emphasizing the experimental
component of policy-making in a democratic society. The experimentalism emphasized by
pragmatic philosophers is deeply embedded in democratic decision-making. In this Article,
I also link the "provisionalness" of answers about gay marriage to the fluidity of the
language mediated by its actual use in living speech. See Mae Kuykendall, Resistance to
Same-Sex Marriageas a Story About Language: Linguistic Failure and the Priorityof a
Living Language, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385 (1999). Paul Brest, in the context of a
symposium on constitutional interpretation that examined the range of views from
originalism and textualism to nonoriginalism, described the "hermeneutic insight" as
suggesting "that judicial review can at best produce contingent conceptions of justice that
depend on who is doing the interpreting or moral philosophizing." See Paul Brest,
Comment, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 663 (1985). Here, I emphasize not simply
that judicial interpretation is contingent, but that given the fluidity of language and the
experimental quality of democracy, all responses to contests over the public language, by
whatever speaker, decision-maker, or opinion leader, are provisional. Thus, the traditional
concerns that judicial review is problematic if it imposes finality on controversial topics in
a democratic system lose some force because of the evolutionary quality of the terms at
issue in gay marriage and, as set forth below, because of the provisional nature of the
answers yielded by the state systems.
5. The statutes reassert the definitional veto of same-sex marriage that lost
persuasiveness in the courts. In the 1970s, courts readily rejected same-sex marriage by
claiming that the definition of marriage was a union of a man and a woman. See, e.g.,
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), rev. denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008
(1974) (citing other courts and arguing that "same-sex relationships are outside of the
proper definition of marriage"); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588,590 (Ky. 1973) (arguing
that the appellants are not entitled to a marriage license because "what they propose is not
a marriage"); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Anonymous v. Anonymous,
325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971). The definitional answer became unpersuasive for
a variety of reasons. A sense by courts that it was circular was the logical jumping off
point. Its circularity became apparent, however, because culturally the meaning of
marriage changed, giving the judicial imagination access to the logical fallacy of beginning
an argument with a conclusion. The effort to reinstate the certitude that judges drew from
the dictionary seems unlikely to endure. The loss of confidence by the judiciary in a
definitional resolution is an emblem of the stop-gap nature of definitional assertions offered
to return stasis to the evolving language of marriage.
In addition, some of the negations go so far as to enter the realm of the jocular. The
current Nebraska proposal for a Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), enacted in response
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they seem unlikely to endure. In addition, efforts by courts to shore up
the attempted gender clarity and boundary maintenance of the statutes
contain hyperbole about the clarity of gender lines that undermines the
statutes.' Second, "gay-friendly" courts issue rulings that, by their
to Vermont's passage of the civil union law, provides as follows: "Only a marriage between
a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska." See Frank Kameny,

Posting on Queerlaw, Nebraska DOMA drive reaches signaturegoal; language questioned
(July 10, 2000) <http://www.qrd.org/qrd/www/qlegal.html>. A posting by activist Frank
Kameny noted:
As it stands, this would seem to say that anything else whatever, of any sort, type
or variety, in any context at all, in the whole vast variety of life and of human
activity, which is not a marriage, is no longer recognized in Nebraska. In short,
Nebraskans would no longer be able to achieve official recognition for ANYthing
that they might do, or for any contract entered into, if it were not a heterosexual
marriage. Those poor Nebraskans, if this goes into effect. They could do nothing
with their lives AT ALL except to get married heterosexually.
Id.; see also Nancy Hicks, Wording of Petition Questioned, LINCOLN J. STAR, July 7, 2000
(quoting state senator as saying that the proposed amendment would cover relationships
that are legal under both the state and the United States Constitutions, rendering invalid
any contract between two people of the same sex, including a father and a son who want
to form a partnership to run a farm or a law practice and two men who form a business
partnership in Iowa).
6. See Phyllis Randolph Frye, Posting on Queerlaw, Lesbians Seek Legal Marriage
Using Recent Texas Decision: Expect Clerk's Office to Follow the Law (Aug. 15, 2000)
<http://www.qrd.org/qrd/www/qlegal.html>. Persons in Texas have successfully applied for
a license for two persons, one of whom is a post-surgery male-to-female transsexual, the
other of whom is female by birth, and both of whom have been deemed female by the
Harris County Clerk on the basis of genital configuration. The applicants argue that
binding Texas precedent, based on the Texas DOMA, requires that a person born with male
genitalia be presumed to be chromosomally and unalterably male. The applicants cite
Littleton v. Prange,9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining of a male-to-female
transsexual that "[tihere are some things we cannot will into being. They just are."), which
denied standing to sue for wrongful death to a surviving spouse on the grounds that the
marriage of a male to a person who had undergone sex change surgery from male to female
was infirm as a matter of law. Extrapolating from Littleton, the applicants demanded that
two persons identified as lesbians be issued a marriage license on the basis of one party's
legally inalterable male biological history. The applicants announced on August 15, 2000,
an intent to apply for a marriage license in the same jurisdiction, Bexar County, where the
binding precedent states that the original assignment of sex as "F" or "M"on the birth
certificate is inalterable. See Frye, Posting on Queerlaw, Lesbians Seek Legal Marriage
<http://www.qrd.org/qrd/www/qlegal.html>. The license was issued on September 6, 2000.
See Same-Sex Couple Find Loophole to Wed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2000.
The opinion in Littleton is an interesting example of a court form of speech about
marriage that is so emphatically negative about the impossibility of including "nonconforming" couples under the rubric of marriage that it lacks probable stability. It has
the expectable characteristic of linguistic fiat: "Marriage is tightly defined in the United
States: 'a legal union between one man and one woman.'" See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 226.
It also interestingly dovetails with tight-lipped common sense and community sentiment
affirming the right of vigilant gender referees to rule which things "just are" and
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forthright grant of marital rights in states with constitutions that can
be readily amended, are patently destined to be preempted by legislative
action or voter referenda.7 The corrective actions are in turn improbably negative for assuring closure in a democratic society. Third, the
action that preempts the court's decision is overtly provisional in that it
assigns constitutional control of defining marriage to the state legislature and thus incorporates, even if insincerely, the possibility of
changes.' Fourth, the legislature attempts the compromise of extending
to same-sex couples the equivalent of marriage while maintaining a
linguistic boundary that stipulates that legally identical statuses may
carry different names, thus explicitly putting the state in the unstable
enterprise of refereeing language.' Finally, more broadly, the question
of marital rights involves a clash of strong forces: the demand of one
group of citizens for fair civic treatment of living arrangements that
share the basic characteristics of marriage' ° and the heated backlash,

presumably to exclude some people from eligibility for any marriage, when their personal

gender history challenges the view that, in gender, things that "just are" never change.
The ability of the courts to remain immune to post-modern theories of the social
construction of gender and thus to the fluidity of the terms in marriage seems unlikely to
be permanent. See, e.g., Monique Wittig, One is Not Born A Woman, reprinted in THE
LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER 103 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993) (arguing that
"woman" is not a natural category and lesbians are not women). Indeed, as I argue above,
it seems likely that courts altered their understanding of the power of a logical claim about
the terms subject to analytic inquiry as a result of the fluidity of underlying terms
involving marriage and gender in contemporary society.
7. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at
*6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (holding that, because the right to marry is a
fundamental right, it cannot be withheld from same-sex couples).
8. See HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 23 (providing power to legislature "to reserve marriage
to opposite-sex couples"). The Hawaii constitution was amended by voter referendum to
overturn the holding of the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59
(Haw. 1993).
9. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864,889 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the state must extend
to same-sex couples the common benefits and protections that flow from marriage under
Vermont law but need not do so through a marriage license); see also An Act Relating to
Civil Unions, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (Supp. 2000); 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves, 91
§§ 1(8), (10), 1999, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, effective Apr. 26, 2000 (reciting the purpose of
the law to "provide eligible same-sex couples the opportunity to 'obtain the same benefits
and protections afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples'" and making a
legislative finding that "[c]ivil marriage under Vermont's marriage statutes consists of a
union between a man and a woman").
10. See Jennifer Wriggins, MarriageLaw andFamily Law: Autonomy, Interdependence
and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265 (2000); see also Baker, 744 A.2d at
864.
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tinged with talk of violence," against any civic recognition of gay
unions. 2
The near certainty that proffered answers are temporary,
given the collision of aspiration and aversion, confers an experimental
quality on the topic and on policy-making. The unresolved and volatile
character of the question places the courts, with their charge to decide
cases that allege unequal treatment by applying principles capable of
being generalized, in a difficult cultural circumstance. The courts must
look for a path between the duty to apply general norms and a
pragmatic concern about the effect on courts and social harmony of
challenging the authoritarian impulses that patrol the language and
reject, in connection with gay marital rights, the civic premises
associated with social cooperation.
The specific political processes in which these policy experiments occur
seem likely to take a place in a public narrative 3 of rights, 4 social
change, 15 court roles, democracy, and the emerging focus of legal
contest over language and symbols.'" The courts will play a central
role because those who wish to marry and are denied the license will
demand that courts intervene. 7 The litigants have no power to force
a result from courts, but they have the power to engage the court in
speech about gay marriage. The power is significant, for it drafts the
courts as participants in a moment of cultural transition. It is the thesis
of this Article that courts are a critical site for the expansion of public

11. See Carey Goldberg, Vermont Residents Split Over Civil Unions Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2000, at A18 (describing threat to shoot vandals who steal anti-gay signs that have
sprouted in response to the passage of the Vermont civil union law).
12. Id.
13. See Charles J. Butler, Note, The Defense of Marriage Act: Congress's Use of
Narrativein the Debate Over Same-Sex Marriage,73 N.Y.U.L. REV. 841,850-78 (describing
the role of narrative in maintaining cultural coherence and giving examples of narratives
about gay people and traditional marriage).
14. See Carlos A. Ball, Communitarianismand Gay Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 443,
514 n.369 (2000) (terming the gay rights movement the "gay rights revolution"); Elvia R.
Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist Legal Theory, 9 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 118 (noting that the "sexual revolution... culminated in the 1970s gay
civil rights movement"); Norman Dorsen, An Agenda for Social Justice Through Law, 40
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 487, 487 (1992) (grouping the gay rights movement with the civil rights
movement, the women's movement, the Vietnam war, and the sexual revolution).
15. See E. J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? 230 (1999) (arguing that proposals to
change marriage enter the public debate when the underlying economic and social changes
associated with the proposed alteration have already happened).
16. Kuykendall, supra note 4; Linda C. McClain, DeliberativeDemocracy, Overlapping
Consensus, and Same-Sex Marriage,66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1241 (1998).
17. New cases will arise in states not yet tested, but the inventiveness of litigants will
also find new ways of placing pressure on the received construct of biological clarity and
legal certitude. See supra note 5.
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discourse in areas in which the polity tends to stasis and adopts, if not
checked, the impulse to foreclose evolutionary change in meanings and
to defend meanings from alteration in the midst of a dynamic, evolving
society."' I draw implicitly on claims that it is a proper goal of the
liberal state committed to autonomy to promote "unconstrained
discussion" about the merits of competing "moral, religious, aesthetic,
and philosophical values."19 In addition, in matters of deep social
divisiveness, courts can play a constructive role in advancing the process
of civil decision-making. In fact, courts are good candidates for
moderation in every sense of the word because they are in charge of
giving reasonable answers to the petitions of litigants and are drawn to
do so in the language brought to the surface by litigation; they are not
good forums for abstractions and ideological wars over whether marriage
is a wise goal for the gay community, or for claims that the recognition
of gay marriage diminishes traditional marriage.20 The commitment
of courts to hear what petitioners tell them, in the spoken language,
gives them a calling as advocates for realism. The general thesis of
Alexander Bickel about the qualities of courts21 takes on a renewed
meaning in light of the movement of our society toward contesting
language.
The project of the courts as open forums for petition, but most
especially courts' project as speakers, assigns to them a historic role in
exploding the vacuum of public speech voiced to celebrate gay marriage.
Indeed, it is largely (though not only) the language that is placed at
issue in legal demands for same-sex marriage; to a certain extent, in

18. See Madhavi Sunder, Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of Exclusion: The
Intellectual Propertizationof Free Speech in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston, 49 STAN. L. REV. 143, 168 (1996) (citing Lawrence Lessig, The
Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 962 (1995)).
19. Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. REV.
385, 403 (1996) (quoting Paul G. Stern, Note, A PluralisticReadingof the FirstAmendment
and Its Relation to Public Discourse, 99 YALE L.J. 925, 934 (1990)).
20. Ironically, however, courts seek a moderation made up of measured analysis of the
implications of the success of feminist and gay challenges to gender roles. The moderation
draws indirectly on discourse that is expressed in radical terms. See, e.g., Marilyn Frye,
Some Reflections on Separatism and Power, reprinted in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
READER 91 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993); Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality
and Lesbian Existence, reprinted in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER 227 (Henry
Abelove et al. eds., 1993). However much as the courts strive to speak in measured, civil
tones, they lack the possibility of disclaiming the radical roots of a revised treatment of the
gendered basis of marriage. Yet a wholesale denial of the factual revision in the culture
is itself radical.
21. See BICKEL, supra note 3, at 26.
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these cases the court's entire act is speech.22 What the court says is
the main product.23 Speech is not a rationalization of a result. It is

22. And the reaction is explicitly to speech. A mechanic at a town meeting voiced a
strong view about official speech relating to marriage:
I believe it's against our constitutional rights to have government and legislation
change the word "marriage" to mean something as ill and as foul as same-sex
partners. I believe anybody that does so cannot do it in clear conscience, because
it is against our constitutional rights to change such a sacred word as "marriage."
Carey Goldberg, Vermont Town Meeting Turns Into Same-Sex Union Forum, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8; 2000, at A18.
23. By contrast, in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), Justice Harlan, in dissent,
emphasized a strategy of silence by positing that the Court should decline to speak on
moral issues and by claiming that his preferred Court decision would be mainly to accord
to married couples a right of silence about their marital lives. The Court's role as a
speaker required immense caution, according to the Justice. He argued that if the Court
were merely asked to decide in the abstract whether the moral judgment made by the
State in forbidding married couples from using contraception was correct, the Court should
hesitate long "before concluding that the Constitution precluded Connecticut from choosing
as it has among.., various views." Id. at 547 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But the Court had
to address a specific outcome associated with the State's power: The police would intrude
into the marital bedroom if the Court did not act. 367 U.S. at 521 (Douglas J., dissenting).
The Court need not speak, but it must act, according to Justice Harlan. Justice Harlan's
disposition to minimize judicial speaking extended to the right of married couples to say
nothing: Intruding criminal machinery into marital privacy would "requir[e] husband and
wife to render account before a criminal tribunal of their uses of [marital] intimacy." 367
U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Harlan's view, once the state disturbed the
circumstance of silence by "acknowledg[ing] a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it,"
stasis should return to the discourse about sexual intimacy unless the State altered it. Id.
The Court should not speak, and it should protect the boundary of speech that acknowledges sexual intimacy but avoids the airing of details concerning it. Yet Justice Harlan's
opinion is an opening moment in intense judicial discourse about sexual practices that has
led the Supreme Court to experiment variously with ways of talking about sex. His paean
to silence by courts did not undo his own judicial recognition of the discourse lying outside
the chosen speech of the State and his evocation of the capacity of the State to adopt
speech that is "no more demonstrably correct or incorrect than are the varieties of
judgment... on marriage and divorce, on adult consensual homosexuality, abortion, and
sterilization, or euthanasia and suicide." Id. at 547. Given the speech that has ensued,
and the demand for same-sex marriage, state courts lack the opportunity to take resort to
protecting citizens from "arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints." Id. at 543.
When cases arise that ask for state courts to speak, the courts have less rhetorical room
than Harlan to claim a stance of silence yet extend relief. Moreover, Justice Harlan's own
claim that he was deferring to the State as speaker is belied by his vetoing the state speech
that parsed the morality of marriage as separable from the morality of specific sexual
practices-despite his care and claim that it is the State that "spoke marriage" as a public
matter and authorized a particular marriage. See id. at 553. Justice Harlan resorted to
a register of speech of his own about the sacredness of marriage, leaning in the end on the
sturdy nonofficial social meaning of the terms "husband" and "wife" to convey a judicial
horror at requiring "husband and wife" to account for their sexual conduct. Id. Also, the
statute was empirically more about the public sphere and the regulation of the speech of
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the result.2 4 The outcome, in a broader sense, is determined by other
forms of social will; state legislatures and voters can veto the practical
effect of the court speech by withdrawing the state benefits associated
with the term "marriage," but they cannot efface the speech of the court.
Moreover, every judicial text that addresses the emerging quest for
same-sex marriage "recognizes" gay marriage. As the legislature may
not efface the speech of the court, no court has the rhetorical option of
zeroing out the speech of the applicants for state licenses to govern their
lives as conducted within a framework of marital bonds. These
applicants bring to a public discursive space the request for state
acknowledgment and public recognition of a rich matrix of pre-judicial
facts. The form of the court's reply does not determine whether or not
courts will enter into the discursive realm of same-sex marriage, but
rather the quality of the public reasoning that the courts' act of speaking
will prompt. Courts, and critics of courts, may take various stonewalling strategies. In the end, the court's structural connection to the
living language" creates an array of linguistic paths, all of which
deepen public concern with same-sex marriage but only some of which
energize and freshen the language in which democratic policy is made
as well as enrich the premises of social cooperation.
II.

THE COURTS AS SPEAKERS: ADOPTING THE SPEECH OF LITIGANTS

A comparison of process in Hawaii and Vermont, two states prompted
to pay the deepest legislative attention to the quest of gay people for

birth control clinics than about intruding into the marital bedroom. See WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 19 (1997). Thus,

Harlan's rhetoric, despite its claim to disdain a court role as a speaker, in reality sought
to destabilize state speech and to disrupt a state-mandated vacuum of public speech.
Finally, Justice Harlan's description of the state of discourse was quickly belied by the tide
of social change, increased openness, and judicial engagement with society that followed.
His description of the isolation of courts from discourse does not ring true.
24. In praising a feature of the capacity of courts compared with legislatures, Alexander
Bickel makes the opposite point: "The courts are concerned with the flesh and blood of an
actual case .... It ...provides an extremely salutary proving ground for all abstractions;

it is conducive, in a phrase of Holmes, to thinking things, not words, and thus to the
evolution of principle by a process that tests as it creates." BICKEL, supra note 3, at 26.
In the case of gay marriage, the courts excel because they "think words" nobody else will
think (or hear) in addition to "thinking the thing" that the words represent. The court's
use of words tests the boundaries of words themselves and expands public discourse, while
pointing toward policy that attaches words to things pragmatically, rather than
dogmatically. Thus, concreteness can attach to words as well as things, expanding Bickel's
conception of a useful dialogue of the courts with the political branches for the current era
when words are contested and treated much like things.
25.

See Kuykendall, supra note 4.

1012

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

marital rights and recognition, suggests that a simple contrast of "elitist"

judicial activism with democratic legislative process fails to capture the
texture of policy-making, or to accurately portray the character, vis a vis
popular input, of judicial, legislative, or referenda-driven policy-making.
The quality of policy-making in this area depends upon the fortuity of
language-enrichment strategies and happy convergences that may
emanate from varied public discursive locations. The view of courts as
top-down bodies that impose new theories or social experiments is
flawed. The courts necessarily become enmeshed in collisions over
meaning and cultural symbols: refusing to recognize emerging patterns
of practice and meaning is as culturally invasive as adopting the
changed usage. When it speaks, the court rearranges the public
vocabulary and either enriches or diminishes the register of public
speech. So too for legislatures, executives, voters, and other institutions.26 But the court alone has an institutional commitment to the
public language. An incorporative treatment of language is not, in any
case, elitist, whatever institution advances the public acknowledgment
of new meanings. The courts necessarily participate, even if reluctantly,
in building a discursive system with an advancing frontier into which
novel terms are admitted to the American territory.
Even though courts inevitably function to expand the boundaries of
public language, some judicial discursive strategies work better than
others to contribute to the civility and the vitality of public dialogue.
Courts destabilize discursive boundaries and open discursive space when
they render restrictive decisions that restrain the development of gay
rights, making the category visible and contested when it was previously
hidden.2 ' The effect of the speech, nonetheless, delays the full flowering of gay citizenship and the attendant contributions that might be
made by gay persons speaking as members of families engaged in the
common project of creating policies to buttress the family as a vehicle of

26. Either policies seal off the public language from the language in which citizens'
lives are spoken, or those who enact policies treat the mission of policy-making as
incorporative. See Sunder, supra note 18, at 148-53.
27. While I am suggesting here that a middle class incorporation of gay sexuality into
the organizing speech that the middle class embraces in connection with marriage will be
the ultimate result of efforts to suppress it, plainly the theories of Michel Foucault about
the effect of nominal suppression of sexual practices and speech as a means of proliferating
discourse about sex is relevant. See, e.g., 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 18
(1978). Because the effort to suppress has passed beyond the explicit effort to suppress
same-sex sexual intimacy and into a contest over language itself, the excited category is
not transgression but the aspiration to be average. The effect of linguistic veto, thus, may
be harder to gauge, but the general point that linguistic vetoes do not work seems clear.
But the link to transgression is not present in the gay-marriage speech confusion.
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social support and civil engagement. Courts also alter discourse when
they impose solutions to controversial claims of gay people for recognition in a manner that voters and legislatures resist,2 8 but the effect
may create backlashes that delay progress and discredit courts as
carriers of a renewed public language. Courts also expand public
discourse when they consciously undertake to teach by giving public
acknowledgment of new forms of identity and self-description while
offering principles of respect and fairness to the polity for incorporating
changed meanings and practices.29
The job of the courts to participate in forms of dialogue with those
presenting claims for recognition gives them an opportunity to model
civil treatment of new identities and the revisions in language that
accompany expressive identities. 0 This opportunity is particularly
present in areas where the contested realm is in large degree the
language used to govern our lives. 3' A simple contrast between judicial
activism and popular sovereignty slights the teaching function of courts
and the mixed strategies of our system for capturing popular opinion and
addressing social needs. The immersion of courts in the language
brought forward by litigants places courts in a key mediating position
relative to social change. Even if courts sometimes deploy some
doctrines, such as the First Amendment, to "conceptualize[] speech as
static . .. deserving legal protection via the shield of speaker autonomy,"32 the project of the courts as speakers with a deep immersion in
the onrushing tide of language and commitment to explanation makes
them a practitioner of "speech as part of a dynamic, dialogic process in
which meaning is constantly recreated and contested." 33 Courts, even

28. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59.
29. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 864.
30. See Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (2000).
31. See LAKOFF, supra note 2, at 100 (arguing that the term "politically correct" is used
as a strategy "to maintain control of language at all costs").
32. Sunder, supra note 18, at 147.
33. Id. Note that plaintiffs have some degree of unchecked power to introduce new
terms into public discourse. Just by denominating themselves, as in Hurley, supra note
18, plaintiffs characterize themselves in multiple and subtle ways without being edited or
overruled by the courts. In some irreducible respects, the courts are a service organization
that facilitates the printing and circulation of self-descriptions of plaintiffs-a vanity press
with access based on filing fees and the ability to frame a claim that can survive the
summary treatment of dismissal without any opinions. By contrast, newspapers retain
greater editorial control, with unreviewable options of editorial silence. Until 1982, the
New York Times generally affirmatively rejected the use of the term "gay," even when the
party concerned would have preferred the term. George Stefano, The New York Times vs.
Gay America, THE ADVOCATE, Dec. 9, 1986, at 43 (noting that, at the time of the article,
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when conservative, often become early transmission belts for novel terms
more easily kept at the margins of the public vocabulary.3 4 Courts
have used First Amendment doctrine to deny gay and lesbian people
access to discursive space,35 as typified in the Boston parade case, yet
the courts themselves powerfully serve as a discursive space into which
a vocabulary of gay and lesbian life gains a degree of entry. Taking the
claims of litigants seriously, the very basic mandate of the court system,
necessarily implicates a degree of openness to linguistic innovation and
may place the judicial imagination slightly in advance of the legislative
or even popular awareness of new realities. An expansive imagination
that results from contact with lived reality is probably not rightly called

the New York Times continued to bar the use of the word "gay" unless it was part of a
proper name or direct quotation). See BREWER'S DICTIONARY OF PHRASE & FABLE:
MILLENNIUM EDITION (rev. by Adrian Room 1999) (describing "gay" as a meaning for

"homosexual" favored by "homosexuals" themselves). Yet in 1974, the First Circuit printed
the case name, Gay Students Organizationof the University of New Hampshire v. Thomas
N. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974), and in 1979 the California Supreme Court printed
the case name, Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone & TelegraphCo., 24 Cal.
3d 458 (Cal. 1979); see also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 8 (1991)
(commenting that "[t]he mere bringing of legal claims and the hearing of cases may
influence ideas").
The courts have tended to be in the vanguard in the evolving racial group self-reference.
Justice Marshall was a key force in legitimizing the term "African-American." In addition,
the courts were early in switching to the use of "she" and "her" to refer to hypothetical
litigants, influenced not by a calling as usage arbiters or radical feminists, but by the need
to rebut the impression that the courts were not gender-neutral by premise and to adopt
the practices in briefs. Indeed, the feminist might well argue that the linguistic
degendering of hypothetical persons was done to preserve the universally male
characteristics of the hypothetical person, by treating the feminine pronoun as the
functional equivalent, entirely lacking informational content, as a signifier of the universal.
In any event, the court immersion in language as presented by plaintiffs, who posited their
alter egos as universal and adrift from the usual expectations as to gender, pushed them
to acknowledge the fluctuation in the empirical assumption that unnamed actors are male.
Persisting in a convention that the main participants in contested public realms were male
ceased to seem editorially sound. The court's service role led to incorporation in judicial
texts of an acknowledgment that the hypothetical legal person had assumed an altered
persona. In a real sense, the court accepted the editorial choices of litigants without
necessarily accepting their substantive claims, bowing to the tide of language but
maintaining various substantive jurisprudential boundaries.
This footnote reflects insights about case names and racial self reference suggested by
R. George Wright, for which I am grateful.
34. For instance, surrogate motherhood became a widely known practice and term
because of a court case that gave it wide visibility. See Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227
(N.J. 1988).
35. Sunder, supra note 18, at 144; see also Hunter, supra note 30, at 54 (arguing that
treating expressive identity claims as one of two mutually exclusive doctrinal categories-expression or equality-weakens the values of antiorthodoxy and inclusion).
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elitism.36 In their way, judges may share a life experience of exposure
to novelty with classes treated as marginal, such as criminals, sexual
37
minorities, and journalists.
In some respects, the dread of court activism is a fear of the existence
of discursive spaces that cannot be sealed off from linguistic innovation.
Rhetoric against courts as vanguards of social change, seen most
generously, implicates a fear that disembodied logic will efface meanings
that enrich and guard the culture. The courts, when they are most
denounced, are imagined as bloodless mandarins whose most fearsome
effect is the devaluing of the linguistic currency that carries cultural
meanings by a studied indifference to embedded meanings. I suggest
here that even when flawed in execution, the court immersion in
language in an open society is humane and life-enhancing. The stake in
courts' discursive interaction with society is the continued vitality of the
very language itself.38 And that stake concerns the fundamental
medium for human life and for democratic health.3 9
Because courts constitute a discursive space, judges range across the
discursive options presented to them by litigants. Some actively shape
their language to incorporate new meanings brought forward by
litigants, while others guard the existing meanings and conventions in
which gender is discussed,"' The courts in whole cannot ignore the
meanings that litigants assign to their interactions if new meanings
persist and recur in legal demands and in needs for mediation. Some
judges are happy sponges for language, while others give ground
grudgingly to the linguistic realities that the premises of adjudicative
contests force to the surface.

36. See Brest, supra note 4, at 664-70. Brest analyzes the accuracy of referring to
judges as members of an opinion elite and concludes that "judges' attitudes on important
social and political issues do not reflect those of the population at large." Id. at 669.
37. Alexander Bickel made a point that bears some resemblance to my argument here.
He suggested that judges were better than legislators in dealing with "the evolution of
principle in novel circumstances." BICKEL, supra note 3, at 25. Moreover, he argued that
"Uludges have ...
the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the
scholar." Id. Whatever resemblance the scholar may have to those at the margins of
society, whose language is in advance of the standard speech of the mainstream, it seems
clear that Bickel's point meshes well with the insight that judges have a contact with
emerging forms of speech and identity that legislatures can more easily ignore.
38. See Sunder, supra note 18, at 166; see also Kuykendall, supra note 4, at 431-32.
39. See Kuykendall, supra note 4, at 433-35.
40. See Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and
Judicial Identity, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 342-43 (1999) (characterizing judicial
rhetoric about transsexuals as striving to constitute the identity of the judge by
maintaining the "natural attitude" that there are two biological sexes and thus maintaining
coherence in the opinions about transsexuals).
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The courts, in this sense, are a part of any culture and a critical site
for sorting out and interpreting the culture. It is not possible for courts
to avoid the effect on the culture created by their role as a listener and
cultural arbitrator. Indeed, opposition to forms of expression, and the
attempt to erect barriers to certain practices, have been analyzed as a
means of ensuring the greater manifestation of a form of transgressive
expression.4 1 A healthy role of courts is to help the political system
and the related social system incorporate change and recognize
expression without lending a transgressive aspect to expression.
Recognition of gay presence in society is often lamented not just by the
anti-gay religious right, but also by radical elements of the gay
community.42 Among radical gay activists, there is nostalgia for status
as sexual outsiders43 with an appetite for stigma that can serve as a
basis for an ongoing radical challenge to middle-class sexual ethics and
the link of family arrangements to economic life prospects. Courts, when
they mediate the language in which gay existence is recognized, do not
necessarily only create negative responses by challenging popular moral
beliefs in a high-handed way. Rather, they provide a vocabulary in
which the factual existence of gay people can be accommodated in a
public policy that emphasizes and celebrates routine middle-class values,
as well as norms of fairness.

III.

THE COURT'S ROLE IN MEDIATING LANGUAGE WARS: ADOPTING
THE USAGE OF LITIGANTS Is NOT ELITIST

There is a consistent strain of criticism regarding decisions by courts
that intervene in the political process in a manner that overturns
legislative and voting preferences.4 4 Recent writing by Mark Tushnet,

41. See A Preface to Transgression, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE:
SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS BY MICHEL FOUCAULT 29 (Donald F. Fouchard, ed.,
1977).
42. See, e.g., DANIEL HARRIS, THE RISE OF GAY CULTURE (1997) (arguing that the
increasing acceptance of gay people harms gay culture by making it blend); see also Now
for a Queer Question About Gay Culture, THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD., U.S. EDITION
(July 12, 1997) (reviewing the range of opinions among gays about the virtues of
assimilation into the predominant culture); Dale Carpenter, The Fear of Being Ordinary,
INDEPENDENT GAY FORUM (Feb. 25, 2001) <http'//www.indegayforum.org/articles/carpenter7
.html> (criticizing the "queer left" for romanticising gay people as "sexual revolutionaries
with alien natures and values").
43.

See, e.g., RUTHANN ROBSON, SAPPHO GOES TO LAW SCHOOL: FRAGMENTS IN LESBIAN

LEGAL THEORY 153-70 (1998) (arguing that lesbians constitute a resistance to the
traditional family and lesbians should resist being either included in or excluded from the
family).

44. Samuel Issacharoff, PolarizedVoting and the PoliticalProcess: The Transformation
of Voting Rights Jurisprudence,90 MICH. L. REV. 1833 (1992); see also Christopher E.
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written from the perspective of a populist wedded to progressive policy
and politics, makes a strong argument against judicial review, with
specific reference to the federal courts. 5 In effect, he argues that the
concept of judicial supremacy mistakenly attributes to judges a superior
capacity to interpret and remain faithful to the Constitution and
damages democratic policy-making by creating a judicial overhang that
causes legislatures to consider the Constitution "inside the courts" rather
than the Constitution for which they are as responsible as are the
courts.4" A populist constitutional law, in which voters and legislatures
lay claim to equal insight about our basic constitutional premises, will
serve us better, according to Tushnet, than reliance on judges to protect
minority rights or interpret specifics of the Constitution.47
Such a claim presumes a moral reasoning that assumes a political
system functions best when it accords general political autonomy to
citizens to mediate moral claims and remains agnostic about specific
answers. The imposition of answers to morally contested issues
sacrifices too much of the principle of political autonomy for the gain it
might make in the area of enforcing tolerance and keeping minorities
safe from majority opinion. Moreover, the courts may not be consistently
more accurate in defining the minority that is being threatened by
majority preference.4
This view assumes that the fulcrum of majority/minority difference
involves a refereeing of Rawlsian autonomy. The courts should only
intervene when the damage to autonomy is so great that the principle
of autonomy will suffer more from respecting majority autonomy than
overturning it. But an emerging body of work emphasizes Rawlsian
autonomy, plus teleological inquiry into the goods achieved from the
stance of valuing autonomy.49 In addition, arguments for a liberalism
grounded in a second-order preference for autonomy proposes that the

Smith, The Supreme Court's Emerging Majority: Restraining the High Court or
Transforming its Role? 24 AKRON L. REV. 393 (1990) (reviewing critical writing about the
Supreme Court as an activist body).
45. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999).

46. Id. at 54-57.

47. Id. at 194; see also ROSENBERG, supra note 33, at 339 (arguing that litigation
misdirects resources to an institution that is constrained from helping litigants, thus
siphoning off crucial resources and talent and potentially weakening political efforts).
48. Compare BICKEL, supra note 3, at 23-28 (suggesting the capacity of courts to
.support and maintain enduring general values") with Brest, supra note 4, at 664
(presenting evidence that judges are nonrepresentative demographically).
49. See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum,Aristotelian SocialDemocracy, in LIBERALISM AND THE
GOOD 203 (Bruce Douglas et al. eds., 1990).
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liberal State should affirmatively take actions to enhance choice, thus
privileging choice at the second-order as a substantive preference of the
State over first-order substantive ways of life grounded in tradition,
custom, and authority.5" Challenging tradition, custom, and authority
should necessarily emanate from courts, which are presented with
autonomy-based objections to the sway of tradition as a block to
experimentation, expanded discourse, and deeper choice. In addition to
the claim that judges should contribute to state enhancement of
autonomy as a substantive good, judges have a calling to referee the
policy issues raised by an existing political constitution and structure
and to participate in moral reasoning. Therefore, they have more than
an equal obligation, as compared with legislators, to infuse the political
system with a habit of morally serious reasoning, particularly in the
interests of advancing autonomy and protecting the vitality of our public
language as a carrier of norms of choice.
Given the background stakes and the capacity of the courts to enrich
our public language, a mere norm, as proposed by Tushnet, that places
controversial issues off limits for judicial pressure does not predictably
improve the quality of public reasoning. On the other hand, true judicial
fiat that disempowers the institutions of democratic choice may reduce
the commitment of mAjoritarian institutions to respectful reasoning that
incorporates the needs of the entire polity, including unfavored
minorities and the norm of enhanced choice for the good of "authored
lives."5 Thus, the real measure of judicial contribution to the polity is
in its insistent encouragement of a currency of debate nourished by the
wellsprings of change in the language through which the citizens shape
their lives and accord them significance. If, as one author has argued,
it should be an affirmative norm of the liberal society that "individuals
are conceived of as part-authors of their own lives rather than as texts
already fully written by others,"52 there is no deeper service possible
from the judiciary than its recognition and promulgation of the language
of the citizens' lives that would otherwise be banished from the public
realm.
Imposing answers to the contests of language-linguistic fiat, or
linguistic foot-stomping-arises throughout the polity. Every branch
serves best when it challenges such decrees and fiats relating to our
public language. Every branch, including the voters, is varyingly

50. See Gardbaum, supra note 19, at 388.

In simple terms, it has been said,

"Tradition's fine, unless you carry it too far. There comes a time when you have to let
common sense take over." Telephone Interview with Mary Kuykendall, September 8, 2000.
51. See Gardbaum, supra note 19, at 393.
52. Id.
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susceptible to dictatorial fits set off by fear of change as manifested in
the language and in emerging identities.53 The courts offer an enriched
public language if they contribute texts that demand from other
branches a teleology bounded by our commitments to equal citizenship
and rights. Identities can be accorded respect within an aspirational
framework provided by those who inhabit the identities and create a
related set of terms and labels for successful community.5 4
IV.

JUDICIAL SPEECH AS EMPIRICAL AND DISTINCT FROM THE
IMPOSITION OF AN OPINION

Justice Holmes has been criticized for "put[ting] forward a fundamentally impoverished account of legal phenomena."55 In Justice Holmes'
zeal to distinguish law from morals, he tended to portray law as a form
of social control, "resting on naked power," without adequate acknowledgment of the law's "general commitment to fairness, generality and
neutrality."56 Thus, it is said, "numbers, (i.e., the legislature), equaled
power, and he saw no alternative to accepting the crowd's desires, no
matter how wrong he thought them."5 7 Justice Holmes is thus said to
have taken an elitist view of the judge as a spectator, indifferent to and
even disdainful of the errors of mass taste. Given the speech activity of
courts, however, the judge is plainly not a passive spectator, inclined to
shrug with boredom at the activities and words brought before the
courts. The obligation of the judge to speak immerses the judiciary in
a struggle over public discourse and makes of the court proceedings a
depository of changing societal texts.
In theorizing about the inevitability of the crowd's tastes prevailing,
"[Holmes] did not consider that government, and that his very decision

53. Justice Scalia raised, to deny, the notion that an anti-gay resolution was adopted
in a "fit of spite." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 864 (disavowing the relevance of the religious or moral
debate over intimate same-sex relationships but analyzing the behavioral characteristics
of same-sex couples for purposes of classifying them as similarly situated or not with
opposite couples, thus arguably examining the "teleology" of the same-sex relationship).
It is significant that, in Baker, the Vermont Supreme Court applied language relating to
rights but also noted that access to a civil marriage license "significantly enhance[s] the
quality of life in our society," id. at 883, and required that the reasons to exclude gay
people from marriage needs to be of "sufficient weight, cogency, and authority that the
justice of the deprivation cannot seriously be questioned." Id. at 884. Notably, despite
disavowing moral inquiry, the court conducted a legal inquiry in terms that avoided a

wooden resort to rights language but instead sought to capture an idea of justice infused
with considerations relating to the relative weight of public concerns.
55. Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 225 (1964).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 249.
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as a Supreme Court Justice, could affect the destiny of those beliefs.""8
Holmes said, "[Ihf people vehemently want to make different kinds of
worlds I don't see what there is to do except for the most powerful to kill
the others .

.

. 2 9 But the commitment of American law and constitu-

tionalism is to find ways to accommodate groups of people with
fundamentally differing world views and indeed to head them off from
killing one another. A good interaction between the branches, in which
each contributes insights about means of reaching accommodations on
divisive social issues, is surely beneficial not merely in holding down the
body count but breathing life into the ideal of discourse and reducing the
various weights of institutional silences ° and societal intimidation.
The recent action of the Senate, whatever its wisdom, in passing hate
crimes legislation that covers crimes motivated by an animus regarding
sexual orientation"' demonstrates the commitment of American lawmaking to reducing social conflict by de-legitimizing violence aimed at
social difference over which war is sometimes the impulse. Judicial
speech, both that which argues against hate crime legislation62 and
that which validates it,63 joins the public discourse that endorses
liberty of opinion and condemns hate-motivated violence.6 4 The
agreement on de-legitimation does not dispose of role questions about
which branch can, by its speech and the outcomes associated with it,
best articulate the norms associated with condemnation of violent
animus against individuals based on a specific characteristic and with

58. Id. at 255.
59. Id. (citing 2 Holmes-Laski Letters 1144 (Howe ed. 1953)). Justice Holmes made a
similar point in his dissent in Lochner v.New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with
the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law.").
60. For a description of the general sway of institutional silence, see MARY DOUGLAS,
How INSTITUTIONS THINK 69-70 (1986), cited in ROBERT A. FERGUSON, UNTOLD STORIES IN
THE LAW, IN LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 89 (Peter Brooks &

Paul Gerwitz, eds. 1996) (arguing that "institutions create shadowed places in which
nothing can be seen and no questions asked," and referring to "the processes of the public
memory").
61. See Direction to the United States Sentencing Commission Regarding Sentencing
Enhancements for Hate Crimes, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 280003; see also U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1
(Supp. 2000) (increasing the sentencing level by three when a defendant "intentionally
selected any victim or any property as the object of the offense of conviction because of the
actual or perceived ...

sexual orientation of any person").

62. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
63. See, e.g., Regina v. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can. 1990).
64. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392 (agreeing wholeheartedly with the Minnesota Supreme
Court that "[ilt is the responsibility, even the obligation, of diverse communities to confront
[hate] messages in whatever form they appear" but concluding that selectively silencing

low-value speech on the basis of content is not permissible as a means).
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equal treatment of all citizens. The discourse activated by legislative
action and judicial response alters public premises and language.
Legislatures have methods and purposes that direct their members to
the art of making policies to serve functional needs of society. Much
legislation favors predominant interests, but it arises from the labors of
a group anchored to empiricism. Testimony, statistics, hypotheses and
demands for responsive laws tether legislatures to the demands created
by emerging patterns of living, producing wealth, and organizing work
and family. Legislatures do not necessarily in a simple sense act as a
conveyor belt for the unfiltered tastes of the "crowd." They apply a
melange of principles, political calculations, and legislative art to
produce arrangements that facilitate social cooperation.
Indeed,
according to Mark Tushnet, legislatures are as good as courts at
"respond[ing] to real human problems," as in the enactment of Megan's
Law to address an actual instance of murder of a child by a previously
convicted sex offender, 65 and to the extent the courts do more abstract
decision-making, the immersion in practicalities of legislatures may be
better.6 Tushnet also argues that claims for courts as educators or
"teachers in a...
national seminar" ignore the teaching function of the
legislature when it, among other things, debates with prospective
Supreme Court appointees the true meaning of the Constitution.67
But arguments that demonstrate that both courts and legislatures
share capacities for forms of reasoning that may protect individuals and
yield sound statements of constitutional principle do not put courts out
of business. As discussants subject to being drafted by litigants, courts
remain responsible for answering questions propounded by litigants.
Moreover, they remain capable, in given instances, of prodding the
political system to achieve what Tushnet aspires to: popular discussions
of constitutional principles conducted by the people, subject to the
guidance of political leaders who anchor the discussion to the basic
principles of our constitutional law.68 The ideal of literate, civil, and
popular commitment to political decisions based on principle and not
merely on vote-counting or political contests about raw preference 9
may be more realistically achievable if courts play a significant role in

65. See

TUSHNET,

supra note 45, at 69.

66. Id. at 66.
67. Id. at 65.
68. Id. at 14 (describing populist constitutional law). For an example of the widespread
resistance to mere discussion of gay marriage, see Ross Sneyd, Remember in November-Backlash Over Vermont Civil Unions Law, Associated Press Newswires, Sept. 6, 2000
(quoting a state representative who voted for the recognition of civil unions as saying of her
constituents, "To some, there is no discussion possible").
69. See TUSHNET, supra note 45, at 14.
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injecting principle into the public discussions of certain subjects.
Moreover, the project of identity formation can be assisted by the
reasoning medium of the court work method. "[Riepresentation or
expression of identity is necessary for that identity to have a social
existence." ° Even though courts may falter in creating a discursive
system that gives recognition to the equality claim implicated in quests
for a presence of identities in the public life of the country,7 1 they
nonetheless provide a locus for discourse about new identities expressed
in new terms. In the matter of same-sex marriage, courts have great
potential to disrupt the evacuation of gay people from discursive space
and to push legislatures toward empiricism and functionalism in dealing
with the social reality of gay families. While there is some judicial
rhetoric to the effect that gay rights are associated with an elite mind
set,72 the reality that many gay families are working class 73 belies

such an image and connects the courts who recognize gay families to the
needs and voice of those who lack social power.
Thus, courts can and do provide input to the legislative process
without in any valid sense becoming "super legislatures" or dictating
outcomes that are not in the end a supremely legislative product-a
mixture of principles, expediency, and guesswork. Courts perform a
valuable assist to legislative process if they help to force a legislature to
act legislatively when it has fallen prey to being nothing more than a
conveyor belt for prejudice and, in so doing, has abdicated the function
of legislation to address social need. The virtual vacuum of state
legislative products addressing the need of gay people for laws that
mediate their marital and family lives can be fairly described as neglect
of a critical legislative function based on an overhang of prejudice and
a tradition of rhetorical stone walls regarding gay life. Courts can do
what it is only natural they do-promptly engage in discourse, veto the
sway of rhetorical voids in public life, and infuse principle into legislative process. Professor Tushnet talks of the "overhang" of judge-made
constitutional law that defuses the legislature's seriousness about its
own responsibility for constitutional fidelity,' but the overhang of

70. See Hunter, supra note 30, at 9.
71. See id. at 19-20.
72. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1634-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. See Lee Badgett, Income Inflation, published by the Institute for Gay and Lesbian
Strategic Studies and Policy Institute of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (New
York 1998) (reviewing studies that suggest gay individual and household incomes are equal
to or less than heterosexual individuals and households).
74. See TUSHNET, supra note 45, at 57.
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silence regarding the lives of one set of constituents has a comparable
weight in terms of legislative deficit.
V.

DISCURSIVE CHOICES-RESPECTING AND RECOGNIZING FAMILIES

AND THEIR SELF-DESCRIPTION VERSUS IMPOSING A RESULT BASED ON

LEGAL PREMISES
A discursive approach by the courts that begins with language-a
degree of recognition that speakers have created same-sex marriage7 5-and then imposes on the polity a request for fair treatment of
those marriages serves a more constructive discursive role than
entitlement reasoning that starts with individual equal rights and then
reasons that each sex must have the same rights to marry without
regard to the biological sex of the marital partner.7" Moreover, the
claim that the resistance to same-sex marriage arises from sex discrimination, however demonstrable as a matter of analytic rigor and
appropriate as an extension of sex equality principles,7 7 is not likely to
Aside from seeming
move those who resist same-sex marriage.
potentially hostile to the context that creates a commonsense understanding of the meaning of marriage as consisting of a husband, who is
male, and a wife, who is female, the argument also carries the additional
burden of challenging received understandings of sex roles and overtly
arguing for their disruption.78
Marriage is not created by logic chopping or entitlement reasoning or
challenges to the male advantages that have gone with exclusive male
access to those positioned culturally as wives. Marriage is a social fact
reflected in the language brought to the courts by the litigants. Like
traditional marriage, same-sex marriage is a social product that has
gradually attained social recognition as part of social practice. Courts
can be most respectful, both of those seeking recognition of their
discursive reality and of the polity to whom the new meaning is novel
and threatening, by publishing and speaking new social meanings79

75. See Kuykendall, supra note 4, at 420-21.
76. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59; see also Andrew Koppelman, Why DiscriminationAgainst
Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination,69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 219, 249 (1994)
(arguing that formal sex discrimination analysis bars discrimination against gays,
including in marriage, and that the homosexuality taboo reinforces male superiority and
should therefore be critiqued on the same basis as sexism and attempts to undermine
sexism).

77. See Koppelman, supra note 76, at 284.
78. Id. at 235.
79. See GRAFF, supra note 15, at 249-53 (reviewing the record of change that has
altered understandings of marriage).
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and then pressing for the fairness principles to be applied to altered
understandings.
In one instance, the court appears to devise a new, ungrounded
meaning by a wooden, or else radical, application of an equality
principle. In the other instance, the court defers to the evolving
language and then broadens the reach and deepens the resonance of the
court's voice as teacher. When the court appears to be the author of a
new meaning by imposing a principle that yields a revision in a word
seen as basic, it encourages the view that meaning can be artificially
imposed in a singular act of stipulation and authorial control; it thus
particularly encourages counter stipulations like the various marriage
definitions. The better approach is for the court to acknowledge the
meaning that has been made by those who marry. To the extent the
court documents and recognizes the spoken lives of its citizens, it
reduces the likelihood of majoritarian dictate and defuses the dread of
changes in the identities and language that govern our lives.
Aside from considerations involving deep questions of the wellsprings
for fidelity to constitutional principles and respect for popular sovereignty, contemporary life may position states in a manner that resembles
that of other institutions concerned with reputation.
Given the
likelihood that the emerging voice of gay people will produce a widespread acceptance of gay "marriage" or civil union, states can arrive at
similar substantive resolutions through processes that give either a
negative or a positive "gloss" to results that remain either tainted or
haloed by the path taken. Courts do a positive act for their particular
state, as well as for our political system, if they encourage legislative
courage and respectfully deliberative decision-making. They can achieve
this result by supplying statements of principle concerning fairness for
the guidance of legislatures, with discretion to allow legislative process
to occur. They can also legitimize intermediate solutions to claims of
right by helping to produce compromises that arise from a positive
rather than negative solicitation of perspectives that includes the
interests of the rights-seekers as well as the reaction of the opponents
of new rights. Finally, if we assume that a principled process supervised
by courts provides a good solution to the state counterpart of the
Marbury tension between the claim of courts to serve as a constitutional
conscience and the immanent capacity of the legislature to provide
constitutionally sensitive rules, then the right approach by courts to
infusing the process with consideration of principle provides a critical
service. Courts, acting prudentially but emphasizing principle, can
defuse one of the classic political problems of constitutionalism. In the
case of the action of the Vermont Supreme Court, which created a
requirement of action by the legislature in a state that insulates the
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collective product of the courts and the legislature from populist
constitutional intervention, the result seems sound. Vermont's ground
rules created a laboratory of speech in which a linguistic fiat could not
arrestdiscourse.
Modern attachment to image may have some relevance to how a state
political system might conceive of its self-interest. States that achieve
a positive resolution of the emerging demand for same-sex marital rights
receive better press than do states that create a divisive climate
perceived as unaccommodating to a segment of the population. Vermont
and Hawaii provide an interesting contrast in this respect. Even though
Vermont has taken heat for its legislative affirmation of same-sex
relationships, giving them the equivalent status of marriage, it has
nonetheless produced a far more favorable set of headlines than has the
story of the meltdown experienced by the Hawaii political system. From
initially being idealized as a haven of tolerance, Hawaii became a large
disappointment to gay couples who had imagined flying to Hawaii for
marriage and a paradise of acceptance. By contrast, Vermont tourist
establishments reported an extremely active period of bookings leading
up to the July 1, 2000, date for the effective time of the civil union
law."0 In addition, the history of Vermont's early rejection of slavery
is favorably cited as part of a consistent and forward-looking commitment of Vermont to freedom and equality.8 '
In the long run, the states that will be given honor in the histories are
those that find constructive paths to meeting the needs of citizens, not
those that claim to have stopped social history in its tracks. Only if one
takes an apocalyptic view of history is it possible to accept an interpretation of social progress as a moral disaster that will undermine society.
In our secular system of government and culture, the incorporation of
morality into government has more to do with helping people to create
and meet responsibilities and obligations than with attempting to
vindicate a stipulated morality based on an all-encompassing and
religion-friendly theory of the good. 2 The secular approach to social

80. Eugene Sloan, Inns, Lodges Expect a "Boom" in Bookings, USA TODAY, June 28,
2000, at 2A.
81. See Pamela Ferdinand, Vermont LegislatureClearsBill Allowing Civil Unions: Gay
Couples Given Rights Like Those of Married People, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2000, at A3
(quoting an onlooker as comparing Vermont's passage of the civil union law to the state's
initiative in being the first to abolish slavery).
82. A theory of the good associated with human sexuality and strongly coincident with
the precepts of religious dogma is provided by a group of writers loosely referred to as the
new natural law theorists. The core of their claim is that same-sex sexual intimacy is
morally inferior because it is not an act of the reproductive kind, which is the only basis
for sexual acts that are "noninstrumental." A truly noninstrumental sexual act is one that
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change is widely apparent in the case of gay marriage and partnerships,
lending support to the viability of an interpretation of the emerging
recognition of gay domestic arrangements as social progress. The
coordinated decision of the Big Three automakers to offer domestic
partner benefits to their workers " coincides with other signs of an
increasingly relaxed social accommodation of the factual existence of gay
people and gay couples. 4 The rhetoric of total moral error-"The day
of judgment is coming, folks"8 -may slow secular change, but prophecies of doom lack the power to disallow the adjustment of policy in light
of new living arrangements. Therefore, if we assume that doom is not
imminent, state policy-making will be more nearly sound if it takes
forms that emphasize positive efforts to accommodate change. Forms of
policy-making that free the public discourse from the effect of traditional

occurs between a married woman and man and is open to reproduction; the result is that
children are accepted rather than willed. Any other sexual act is morally inferior, and, by
implication, unacceptable morally. At a minimum, according to these writers, the State
should express moral disapproval of morally inferior sexual acts and should in no event
offer affirmative sanction to sexually inferior practices. Andrew Koppelman has provided
a very useful overview of this body of writing. See Andrew Koppelman, Is Marriage
Inherently Heterosexual? 42 AM. J. JURIS. 51 (1997).
83. Keith Bradsher, Big CarmakersExtend Benefits to Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES, June
9, 2000, at C1 (noting the significance of a corporate move to offer domestic-partner
benefits in Midwestern companies).
84. See, e.g., Kate Zernike, Gay Couples Are Accepted as Role Models at Exeter, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 2000, at A18 (describing decisions of prep schools to allow gay and lesbian
couples to serve as dormitory parents); Thom Nickels, Gays on TV: Life Beyond Sitcoms,
THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, January 8, 2000, at A9 (suggesting that Wisconsin press
treated as "silly" negative comments by politician demanding removal from air of television
magazine series that portrayed two gay farmers in Wisconsin); Carlie Steen, Kate Kendell
Speaks on Lessons From the Knight Campaign, CENTER VOICE, June/July 2000 (describing
claim in California by "Radical Right" that opposition to gay marriage was not "anti-gay,"
while expressing support for domestic partnerships); FloridaAppeals Court Rejects Societal
Homophobia in Lesbian Custody Case, LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES (June 2000) (describing
decision in Jacoby v. Jacoby, 763 So. 2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) as "important
advance for gay parents in a state that has not been hospitable to their claims"); Randal
C. Archibold, PoliticalMemo; For Lazio, Uphill Route for Gay Support, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2000, at B1 (quoting Richard Tafel, executive director of Log Cabin Republicans,
Republican gay political organization, describing "a remarkable shift ... in that candidates
across the country now reach out to a group they had previously shunned" and citing
meetings with Governor George W. Bush by gay political representatives and first-ever
acceptance of Log Cabin Republicans' delegation to a state-nominating convention, with
chapter leader pictured shaking hands with New York State Republican chairman).
85. Ross Sneyd, House Committee Passes Civil Unions Bill, Associated Press
Newswires, March 2, 2000 (quoting Randall Terry in connection with a Vermont house
committee passing civil unions bill).
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silences are, in this view, better than the forms that fill a rhetorical
vacuum with "hysterical" 6 speech, or that leave silence.
VI.

THE MERITS OF DEBATE

Professor Bill Eskridge has argued that the presence in anti-gay public
animus and rhetoric of the element of the vicious is a consideration
against giving vent in public policy to the Kulturkampf referred to by
Justice Scalia in making policy about the status of gay persons in
American society.87 The element of the vicious can be masked in some
fora, however. The masking permits homophobia to wear a happy face.
In statewide referenda, there is a tendency to employ rhetoric that
denies anti-gay animus with a claim that it is merely prudent and
necessary to "protect" marriage from being diluted by including same-sex
couples within its ambit."5 The result is that gay people are made the
subject of an anti-gay solicitation that is disguised with happy talk.
There is a particular cruelty to rhetoric that covers disdain with a smile.
The rhetorical strategies used against gay people-Unsayings 9 and the
religious-based rhetorical program of repetition, flattening, and the
attitude of certainty9°-have great effect in the mass advertising of a
referendum. The certitude of homophobia, given a benign face, occupies
the rhetorical space and crowds out a reform message.9 1
By contrast, the emerging reform view of gayness, and a willingness
to listen to the lives of gay people, has a chance to flourish in a civil
setting created by a debate driven by a premise that the State has
obligations to provide structures that address spoken lives. The
immanent hystericism in anti-gay speech 92 is forced to the surface by
a process that begins with a premise of respect for gay citizens. The
result is an exposure of the rhetorical underpinnings of the benign antigay speech that dominates the discursive vacuum of statewide referenda
and mass advertising. The "grammar of gay lives" reaches the ear and

86. MARK D. JORDAN, HOMOSEXUALITY IN MODERN CATHOLICISM: THE SILENCE OF
SODOM 111 (2000).

87. William N. Eskridge, Jr.,A Jurisprudenceof"Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411,
2413 (1997).
88. CaliforniansPrepareto Pass Judgment on Gay Marriages, Fox News: Edge with
Paula Zahn (Mar. 6, 2000) 2000 WL 16092740 (interview with Robert Glazier, Yes on 22
Campaign Spokesman) (describing campaign as "a positive, upbeat attempt to make sure
we focus on pro-traditional marriage, not an antigay campaign in any way, shape or form").
89. See Kuykendall, supra note 4, at 385.
90. JORDAN, supra note 86, at 55.
91. See JORDAN, supra note 86, at 58; Douglas, supra note 60.
92. See JORDAN, supra note 86, at 111.
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enters the voice of the state, while the program of rhetorical silencing
that has held sway becomes tellingly shrill when a core of civil speech
enters the public arena.
In Vermont, when the legislature accepted the mandate of the
Vermont Supreme Court to create policy placing gay couples on a legal
par with opposite-sex couples who marry, the State experienced a
spectrum of political discourse: the populism of the town meetings, with
heated exchanges about the court and the legislature and chastisement
of the town representative and claims that the direct voice of the people
should govern;93 the civil exchange of legislative debate, with claims by
the legislators that they should follow a model of conscience guided by
principles of nondiscrimination even if it meant electoral defeat; and
national-based, divisive campaigns of professional advocates against
forms of social change, including the legal availability of abortion as well
as same-sex marriage and gay visibility. Many of the Vermont
legislators reacted negatively to the presence, rhetoric, and manner of
Terry Randall, the anti-abortion activist from New York. 4
The town meetings were almost universally opposed to both same-sex
marriage and the parallel recognition of civil unions for gay people. 5
The opposition was vociferous, but it nonetheless had the quality of a
quarrel among neighbors9" rather than an apocalyptic confrontation of
counter worlds. 7 The Vermont town meetings contained a strong
streak of homespun anger that the people's will would be thwarted if
same-sex couples received legal recognition of any kind. Yet it can
hardly be said that the will of the people had no effect. Towns voted
recommendations to the legislature to define marriage as a union
between a man and a woman." The legislature did so." Despite a
disposition on the part of many legislators to respect the teaching of the
Vermont Supreme Court about equality and nondiscrimination and the
liberal predispositions of several who favored same-sex marriage, a sense
of the politically possible pervaded the legislative process. While some

93. Goldberg, supra note 22, at A18.
94. Ann LoLordo, Gay Rights Issue draws a fiery foe to Vermont; Anti-Abortion leader
organizes opposition to same-sex unions, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 6, 2000, at 1A.
95. Gay Marriage Towns, Associated Press Newswires, Mar. 8, 2000.

96. See Goldberg, supra note 22 (describing exchange of statements at town meeting
between state representative who described his vote as a matter of conscience balanced by
constituent's right to vote in November and constituent's response, "You'll be out").
97. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 95.
99. See An Act Relating to Civil Unions, supra note 9.
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legislators, and even the Governor,' 0 shared with their constituents
the notion that popular stipulation and a claim of ageless tradition' 01
could control the meaning of a word 10 2 and that the word "marriage"
should be kept exclusive by legislative mandate, there was also a
willingness by some to yield to the popular aversion by incorporating
into the State's vocabulary the expanded meaning of the word "marriage" that has become part of the culture. 10 3 In the end, legislators
chose to take a Burkean approach0 4 of applying independent judgment, educated by the opinion rendered by the Vermont Supreme Court,
and expressing a willingness to accept the voter's rebuke.
A common compromise reached by legislative bodies, including city
councils when met by gay pressure for domestic-partner ordinances and
statutes and counter pressure from opponents of gay rights and
recognition, is to create a domestic partner status that is available to
any group of two or more people living in an arrangement of shared
domestic life. 05 Grandparents and grandchildren are eligible, as are
nonsexual roommates, siblings, uncles and nephews, and so on."° The
purpose is to desexualize the understanding of domestic-partner laws,
thus preserving the insistence of conservative theorists that the State
not affirmatively sanction same-sex sexual intimacy. 7 Because the
anticipated living arrangements covered by these desexed statutes are
so broad and varied, the reciprocal obligations are considerably less.
Indeed, there is no pre-existing model for these legal units, so the legal
content is thin."'

100. Mubarak Dahir, Profile in Courage, THE ADVOCATE (May 23, 2000) <http://www.
advocate.com/html/stories/812/812_howarddean.asp.> (asserting that "marriage is anything
but traditional").
101. But see GRAFF, supra note 15, at xi (asserting that "the West's marriage history
is plenty contentious").
102. Mae Kuykendall, An Essay on Defined Terms and CulturalConsensus, 13 J. L. &
POL. 199, 200 (1997).
103. See Kuykendall, supra note 4, at 412; E.J. Graff, Vermont's High Court Avoids the
M-Word and Makes History, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 2, 2000, at C7.
104. See Dale Carpenter, A Conservative Defense of Romer v. Evans (manuscript on file
with author) (arguing that conservative principles found in Edmund Burke can be deployed
in support of gay rights). For some voters' reaction, see Sneyd, supra note 68 (quoting a
Vermont voter as saying "voting her conscience was just uncalled for").
105. See Kuykendall, supra note 4, at 388 n.15.
106. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-2 to -7 (Supp. 1999).
107. See supra note 82.
108. A good summary of the jurisdictions that offer domestic-partner registration can
be found at <http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-reg.html>. The site offers advice, including
the warning that registering as a domestic partner may create joint financial liability
without providing any benefits.
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But in a legislative process dominated by pressure groups and subtle,
or blatant, anti-gay rhetoric, it is easy for legislatures to choose a
neutered domestic partner arrangement, in which the predominating
image is of post- or pre-sexual celibates. Indeed, the "closeting" of gay
people once took the form of their being treated as the unmarried family
member, in need of domestic arrangements disjoined from sexual liaison.
The neutered domestic partner ordinance is a reinstatement of the
nearly extinct practice of reading gay people as sexless. The symbolic
claims of same-sex couples to status recognition can be conveniently
unheard in a legislative process that will happily yield to the submersion
of a gay perspective related to dignitary issues. The resentment and
underlying viciousness of attitudes about according gay people equal
treatment in their fundamental life arrangements readily supports a
bland rejection of the petitions of gay people for the creation of an
institution molded to their lives.
Interestingly, the Vermont legislature rejected an explicit suggestion
that a state recognition of "reciprocal beneficiary" arrangements be
extended to any combination of persons, including same-sex couples.
The suggestion was the standard form taken by conservative opponents
of state recognition of sexual relationships between persons of the same
sex. But the frequent appeal of this maneuver of appealing both to
resentment that same-sex couples would receive a state benefit not made
more widely available had no traction in the Vermont legislature. The
legislature chose instead to accord specific recognition to the qualities of
gay marriage that give it an empirical resemblance to heterosexual
marriage rather than economically based nonsexual arrangements of
mainly practicality and mutual need. The legislature, which by virtue
of the mandate of the supreme court had immersed itself in hearings
that emphasized empirical reality, set aside a special arrangement for
blood relatives. Blood relatives could become "reciprocal beneficiaries,"
providing a smaller range of benefits suited to the wishes of persons
sharing a household but not the sense of common fate associated with
marriage. In this way, the legislature addressed the actual needs of a
type of household, but did so with attention to what made kinship
households different from same-sex couples, who have pledged their lives
to one another and in many instances created a shared parental
relationship with a child, or with several children. Following the lead
of the Vermont Supreme Court, the legislature made distinctions bearing
a teleological component: The good served by gay unions is not the same
as the good served by roommate groupings, in the view of the empirically
sensitized and fairness-seeking legislators. Whatever the eventual fate
of the provisional answer provided by Vermont to the quest of some
people for marital rights for same-sex couples on a par with existing
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legal marriage, the Vermont Supreme Court set in motion a process that
brought about an unusual effort by a state legislature to document and
provide fair legislative treatment for the reality of same-sex marital
relationships.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In contemporary battles that cluster around a contest over the
language, long-standing views about the role of courts assume altered
significance. The argument that the U.S. Supreme Court Justices are
teachers in a national seminar. 9 has become shopworn and encountered repeated critique."0 But the role of the courts as the institution
most drenched in language ensures that the insight retains and even
takes on power. As contests over the terms that govern our lives
intensify and enter the legislative arena overtly, with majoritarian
inclinations to stop certain types of linguistic change that threaten
received status differentiations, the courts take on a function of
recording language that is otherwise banished from the public realm.
If not teachers in state-by-state seminar, the state judges are at least
participants, by choice or not, in a societal debate that proceeds in fits
and starts and that tends to suppress an entire vocabulary of marital
commitment. Without the courts, the societal debate would not generate
texts that confer authoritative voice on the reality of same-sex marital
commitments, except perhaps in liturgy and theological tracts. Thus,
the courts are a vital infrastructure in the development of a discourse
fed by streams of linguistic and social change. They are an infrastructure for keeping our public language vital. The courts are our grammarians in the large sense of nourishers of the genius of democratic speech.
They challenge the coarseness of the public vacuum about gay lives by
forcing to the surface the idiom in which gay lives are lived. They are
thus simultaneously elitist and populist. As elitists, they challenge the
emptiness of public language about gay people and infuse the public
debate with a language of principle. As populists, they bring to the
attention of moral elitists the fact of the same-sex marital idiom. They
are a cultural discursive resource, contributing text no other author
could write. Perhaps better than any other author, they transcend the
myth of the solitary genius and function in the incorporative style to
produce texts best explained as cultural pastiche.

109. E. V. Rostow, The DemocraticCharacterof JudicialReview, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193,
208 (1952).
110. See TUSHNET, supra note 45, at 65.
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In the matter of same-sex marriage, courts generate valuable societal
texts that no other source could either create or publish so widely. The
texts are valuable for many reasons. They audition as the types of
artifact that the Myra Bradwell opinion became: an attempt at certitude
that is celebrated in retrospect as a vain expression of cultural certainty
and natural fact."' As discussants, courts that rush to the barricades
against the coming tide of words create strikingly unconvincing speech
acts. Instead of stopping the river of speech, they stand as markers of
the exhaustion of the trope of gender certitude." 2 Other courts,
wedded to neutral principles, experiment with bases for judicial
intervention against the majoritarian insistence on keeping marriage
exclusive to opposite-sex couples and thus unsettle our understanding of
the stipulations by which gender can still trump neutral principles."11
Overtly prudential and experimental courts, like the Vermont Supreme
Court, offer an alternative vocabulary for same-sex marital intimacy that
invites a provisional linguistic way station-civil union-between a void
of speech and the full dignity of the term "marriage." By recognizing
same-sex marital intimacy as social fact, these courts publish a new
meaning for the word "marriage" even while allowing the legislature to
delay making a conforming entry in its own dictionary of public
language.
In sum, courts talk. Their speech takes on a character, by virtue of
their being courts, that creates new discursive realities. Though their
speech is not the final word, in the end, nothing is the same. Wittingly
or not, gracefully or clumsily, courts build the discourse of same-sex
marriage. Because words matter, however, forms of speech that guide
the political system toward civil discourse are superior. Discourse that
combines recognition of the spoken lives of citizens, investigates the
secular teleology of intimate bonds, and provides answers that create a
framework for legislative response to the empirical reality of same-sex
marital arrangements offers a degree of justice, a hope for social
harmony, and an opportunity for democratic felicity.

111.
("There
112.
113.

Compare Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 130 (1872) with Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231
are some things we cannot will into being. They just are.").
Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 226; see Kuykendall, supra note 102, at 200.
Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *3-4.

